INTRODUCTION
In his Grundlegung zur Metapbysik de Sitten , Immanuel Kant argues for the necessity of seeing human beings as ends in themselves, rather than as means to other ends: "So act as tc treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only".' This principle has importance in many contexts -even in analysing poverty, pro gress an'd planning. Human beings are the agents, beneficiaries and adjudicators of progress, but they also happen to be -directly or indirectly -the primary means of all production. This dual role of human beings provides a rich ground for confu sion of ends and means in planning and policy. making. Indeed, it can -and frequently does take the form of focusing on production and pros perityas the essence of progress, treating people as the means through which that productive progress is brought about (rather than seeing the lives of people as the ultimate concern and treating pro duction and prosperity merely as means to those lives).
Indeed, the widely prevalent concentration on the expansion of real income and on .econornic growth as the characteristics of successful devel opment can be precisely an aspect of the mistake against which Kant had warned. This problem is particularly pivotal in the assessment and planning of economic development. The problem does not, of course , lie in the fact that the pursuit of eco nomic prosperity is typically t3.ken to be a major have astonishingly low achievfmentsin the quality of life, with the bulk of the population being sub ject to premature mortality, escapable morbidity, overwhelming illiteracy and so 00. Just to illustrate an aspect of the problem, the GNP per capita of six countries is given in modities produced per capita) and still be very poor in the achieved quality of human life. South Africa, with five or six times the GNP per capita of Sri Lanka or China, has a much lower longevity rate, and the same applies in different ways to Brazil, Mexico, Oman, and indeed to many other countries not included in this table.
There are, therefore, really two distinct is sues here. First, economic prosperity is no more than one of the means'to enriching the lives of people.It is a foundational confusion to give it the status of an end. Secondly, even as a means, merely enhancing average economic opulence can be quite inefficient in the pursuit of the really valu able ends. In makingsure that development plan ning and general policy-making do not suffer from costly confusions of ends and means, we have to face the issue of identification of ends, in terms of which the effectiveness of the means can be systematically assessed. This paper is concerned with discussing the nature and implications of that general task.
THE CAPABILITY APPROACH: CONCEPTUAL ROOTS
The particular line of reasoning that will be pur sued here is based on evaluating social change in terms of the richness of human life resulting from it. But the quality of human life is itself a matter of great complexity. The approach that will be used here, whichis sometimes called the "capabilityap proach", sees human life as a set of "doings and beings" -we may call them "functionings" -and it relates the evaluation of the quality of life to the assessment of the capability to function. It is an approach that I have tried to explore in some de tail; both conceptually and in terms of its empiri cal implications.i The roots of the approach go back at least to Adam Smith and Karl Marx, and indeed to Aristotle. In investigating the problem of "politicaldis tribution", Aristotle made extensive use of his analysis of "the good of human beings", and this he linked with his examination of "the functions of man" and his exploration of "life in the sense of activity.! The Aristotelian theory is, of course,
Readings in Human Development
highly ambitious and involves elements that go well beyond this particular issue (e.g., it takes a specific view of human nature and relates a notion of objective goodness to it). But the argument for seeing the quality of life in terms of valued activi ties and the capability to achieve these activities has much broader relevance and application.
Among the classical political economists, 
UTILI1 OBlEe
The cal merely ' I the capability of the person to achieve them has to be appropriately valued.
In the -view that is being pursued here, the constituent elements of life are seen as a combina tion of various different functionings (a "function ing n-tuple"). This amounts to seeinga person in, as it were, an "active" rather than a "passive" form (but neither the various states of being nor even the "doings" need necessarily be "athletic" ones). The included items may vary from such elemen tary functionings as escaping morbidity and mor tality, being adequately nourished, undertaking usual movements etc., to many complex function ings such as achieving self-respect, taking part in the life of the community and appearingin public without shame (the last a functioning that was illuminatingly discussed by Adam Smith? as an achievement that is valued in all societies, but the. precise commodity requirement of which, he pointed out, varies from society to society). The ' claim is that the functionings are constitutive of a person's being, and an evaluation of a person's well-being has to take the form of an assessment of these constituent elements.
The primitive notion in the approach is that of functionings -seen as constitutive elements of living. A functioning is an achievement of a per son: what he or she manages to do or to be, and any such functioning reflects, as it were, a part of the state of that person. The capability of a person is a derived notion. It reflects the various combi nations of functionings (doings and beings) he or she can achieve.P It takes a certain view of living as a combination of various" doings and beings". Capability reflects a person's freedom to choose between different ways of living. The underlying motivation -the focusing on freedom -is well captured by Marx' s claim that what we need is "replacing the domination of circumstances and chance overindividuals by the dominationof indi viduals over chance and circumstaaces".'! UTILITARIAN CALCULUS VERSUS OBJECTIVE . DEPRIVATION The capability approach can be contrasted not merely with commodity-based systems of evalua tion, but alsowith the utility based assessment. The utilitarian notion of value, whichis invoked explic itly or by implication in much of welfare econom ics,sees value, ultimately, onlyin individual utility, which is defined in terms of some mental condi tion, such as pleasure, happiness, desire-fulfilment. This subjectivist perspective has been extensively used, but it can be verymisleading, sinceit may fail to reflect a person's real deprivation.
A thoroughly deprived person,leading a very reduced life, might not appear to be badly off in termsof the mentalmetric of utility, if the hardship is acceptedwith no-grumbling resignation. In situ ations of long-standing deprivation, the victims do not go on weeping all the time, and very often make great efforts to take pleasure in small mer cies and to cut down personal ' desires to modest "realistic" -proportions. The person's depriva tion, then, may not at all show up in the metries of pleasure, desire-fulfilment etc., even though he or she may be quite unable to be adequately nour ished, decently clothed, minimally educated and so on. 12 This issue, apart from its foundational rele vance, may have some immediate bearingon prac tical public policy. Smugness about continued deprivation and vulnerability isoften made to look justified on grounds of lack of strong public de mand and forcefully expressed desire for 'remov ing these impediments, 13 AMBIGUITIES, PRECISION AND RELEVANCE There are many ambiguities in the conceptual framework of the capability approach. Indeed, the nature of human life and the content of human freedom are themselves far from unproblematic concepts. It is not my purpose to brush these dif ficult questions under the carpet. Inso far as there are genuine ambiguities in the underlying objects of value, these will be reflected in corresponding ambiguities in the characterization of capability. The need for this relates to a methodological point, whichI havetried to defend elsewhere, that if an underlying idea has an essential ambiguity:a precise formulation of that idea must try to cap-ture that ambiguity rather than attempt to lose it. 14 Even when precisely capturing an ambiguity proves to be a difficult exercise, that is not an ar gument for forgetting the complex nature of the concept and seeking a spuriously narrow exact ness. In social investigation and measurement, it is undoubtedly more important to be vaguely right than to be precisely wrong. 15 It should be noted also that there is always an element of real choice in the description of functionings, since the format of "doings" and "beings" permits additional "achievements" to be defined and included. Frequently, the same doings and beings can be seen from different perspec tives, with varying emphases. Also, some function ings may be easy to describe, but of no great inter est in the relevant context (e.g., using a particular washing powder in doing the washing).16There is no escape from the problem of evaluation in se lecting a class of functionings as important and others as not so. The evaluative exercise cannot be fully addressed without explicitly facing questions concerning what are the valuable achievements and freedoms, and which are not. The chosen focus has to be related to the underlying social concerns and values, in terms of which some de finable functionings and capabilities may be im portant and others quite trivial and negligible. The need for selection and discrimination is neither an embarrassment nor a unique difficulty for the con ceptualization of functioning and capability. 17 In the context of some types of welfare analysis, for example, in dealing with extreme poverty in developing economies, we may be able to go a long distance in terms of a relatively small number of centrally important functionings and the corresponding capabilities, such as the ability to be well-nourished and well-sheltered, the cap ability of escaping avoidable morbidity and pre mature mortality and so forth. 18 In other contexts, including more general problems of assessing eco nomic and social development, the list may have to be much longer and much more diverse.l? The task of specification must relate to the underlying motivation of the exercise as well as dealing with the social values involved.
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QUALITY OF LIFE, BASIC NEEDS AND CAPABILITY
There is an extensive literature in development economics concerned with valuing the quality oG life, the fulfilment of basic needs and related m~ ters. 20 That literature has been quite influentialin recent years in drawing attention to neglected as pects of economic and social development. It is, however, fair to say that these writings have been typically comprehensively ignored in the theory of welfare economics, which has tended to treat these contributions as essentially ad hoc suggestions. This treatment is partly the result of the concern of welfare theory that proposals . should not just appeal to intuitions but also be structured and founded. It also reflects the intellectual standing that such traditional approaches as utilitarian eval uation enjoy in welfare theory, and which serves as a barrier to accepting departures even when they seem attractive . The inability of utility-based eval uations to cope with persistent deprivations was discussed earlier, but in the welfare-economic lit erature the hold of this tradition has been hard to dislodge.
The charge of "ad hoc-ness" against the de velopment literature relates to the different modes of arguing that are used in welfare. theory and in development theory . As far as the normative struc ture is concerned, the latter tends to be rather im mediate, appealing to strong intuitions that seem obvious enough. Welfare theory, on the other hand, tends to take a more circuitous route, with great elaboration and defense of the foundations of the approach in question . To bridge the gap, we have to compare and contrast the foundational features underlying the concern with quality of life, needs etc. with the informational foundations of the more traditional approaches used in welfare economics and moral philosophy such as utilitar ianism. It is precisely in this context that the advantages of the capability approach become perspicuous. The view of human life seen as a combination of various functionings and capa bilities, and the analysis of human freedom as a central feature of living, provide a differently grounded foundation route to the evaluative exer cise. This informational foundation contrasts with the evaluative bases incorporated in the more tra ditional foundations used in welfare economics.i! The "basic needs" literature has, in fact, tended to suffer a little from uncertainties about how basic needs should be specified. The original formulations often took the form of defining basic needs in terms of needs for certain minimal amounts of essential commodities such as food, clothing and shelter, If this type of formulation is used, th~n the literature remains imprisoned in the mould of commodity centered evaluation, and can in fact be accused of adopting a form of "com modity fetishism", The objects of value canscarcely be the holdings of commodities. Judged even as means, the usefulness of the commodity-perspec tive is severely compromised by the variability of the conversion of commodities into capabilities. For example, the requirement of food and of nutri entsfor the capability of beingwell nourished may greatly vary from person to person, depending on metabolic rates, body size, gender,pregnancy, age, climatic conditions, parasitic ailments and so onP The evaluation of commodity holdings or of in comes (with which to purchase commodities) can be at best a proxyfor the things that really matter, but unfortunately it does not seem to be a particu larlygood proxy in most cases. 23 
RAWLS, PRIMARY GOODS AND FREEDOMS
The concern with commodities and means of achievement, with which the motivation of the ca pability approach is being contrasted, happens to be, in fact, influential in the literature of modem moral philosophy as well. For example, in John Rawls' outstanding book on justice (arguably the most important contribution to moral philosophy in recent decades), the concentration is on the _holdings of "primarygoods" of different peoplein making interpersonal comparisons. His theory of justice, particularly the "difference principle", is dependent on this procedure for interpersonal comparisons. This procedure has the feature of being partly commodity-based, since the list of primary goods includes "income and wealth", in addition to "the basic liberties", "powersand pre rogatives of offices and positions of responsibil ity", "social bases of self-respect" and so on.2 4 Indeed, the entire list of "primarygoods" of Rawls is concerned with means rather than ends; they deal with things that help to achieve what we want to achieve, rather than either with achieve ment as such or even with the freedom to achieve. Being nourished is not part of the list, but having the income to buy food certainly is. Similarly, the social bases of self-respectbelong to the list in a wayself-respect as such does not.
Rawls is much concerned that the fact that different people have different ends must not be lost in the evaluative process, and people should have the freedom to pursue their respective ends. This concern is indeed important, and the capa bilityapproach is also much involved with valuing freedom as such. In fact, it can be argued that the capability approach gives a better account of the freedoms actually enjoyed by differentpeople than can be obtained from looking merely at the hold ingsof primarygoods. Primarygoods are means to freedoms, whereas capabilities are expressions of freedoms themselves.
The motivations underlying the Rawlsian theory and the capability approach are similar, but the accountings are different. The problem with the Rawlsian accountinglies in -the fact that, even for the same ends, people's ability to convert pri mary goods into achievements differs, so that an interpersonalcomparison based on the holdings of primary goods cannot, in general, also reflect the ranking of their respective real freedoms to pursue any given -or variable -ends. The variability in the conversion rates between persons for given ends is a problem that is embedded in the wider problem of variability of primarygoodsneeded for differentpersons pursuing their respective ends. 25 Hence, a similar criticism applies to Rawlsian ac counting procedure as applies to parts of the basic-needs literature for their concentration on .means (such as commodities) as opposed to achievements or the freedom to achieve. The contrast between the intrinsic and the instrumental views of freedom is quite a deep one, and I have discussed the importance of the dis tinction elsewhere. 26 Both views can be accommo dated within one capability approach. With the in strumental view, the capability one is valued only for the sake of the best alternative available for choice (or the actual alternative chosen). This way of evaluating a capability set by the value of one distinguished element in it can be called "elemen tary evaluation". 27 If, on the other.hand, freedom is intrinsically valued, then elementary evaluation will be inadequate, since the opportunity to choose other alternatives is of significance of its own. To bring out the distinction, it may be noted that if all other than the chosen alternative were to become unavailable, then there would be a real loss in the case of the intrinsic view, but not in the instrumental, since the alternative chosen is still available.
In terms of practical application, the intrin sic view is much harder to reflect than the instru mental view,since our direct observations relate to what was ch~sen and achieved. The estimation what could have been chosen is, by its very nature, more problematic (involving, in particular, as sumptions about the constraints actually faced by the person). The limits of practical calculations are
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set by data restrictions, and this can be particularly hard on the representation of capability sets in full, as opposed to judging the capability sets by the observed functioning achievements.
There is no real loss involved in using the ca pability approach in this reduced form if the in strumental view of freedom is taken, but there is loss if the intrinsic view is accepted: For the lat ter, a presentation of the capability set as such is important.
In fact, neither the instrumental view nor the intrinsic view is likely to be fully adequate. Cer tainly, freedom is a means to achievement, whethet or not it is also intrinsically important, so that the instrumental view must be inter alia present in any use of the capability approach. Also, even if we find in general the instrumental view to be fairly adequate, there would clearly be cases in which it is extremely limited . For example , the person who fasts, that is, starves out of choice, can hardly be seen as being similarly deprived as a per son who has no option but to starve because of penury. Even though their observed functionings may be the same, at least in the crude representa tion of functionings, their predicaments are not the same.
In practice , even if in general the capability approach is used in the reduced form of concen trating on the chosen functioning combination, some systematic supplementation would be needed to take care of cases in which the freedom enjoyed is of clear and immediate interest. There may be no great difficulty in doing this supplementation in many cases, once the problem is posed clearly enough and the data search is made purposive and precise. Sometimes it would be useful to redefine the functionings in what is called a "refined" way, to take note of some of the obviously relevant alternatives that were available, but not chosen . Indeed, fasting is an example of a "refined" func tioning, and contrasts with the unrefined function ing of "starving" , which does not specify whether or not this was by choice. 28 The important issue does not concern the existence or not of some ac tual word (such as fasting) that reflects the refined functioning (that is largely a matter of linguistic convention), but assessing whether or not such re As a matter of fact, the informational base of functionings is still a much finer basis of evalua tion of the quality of life and economic progress than various alternatives more commonly recom mended, such as individual utilities or commodity holdings. The commodity fetishism of the former and the subjectivist metric of the latter make them deeply problematic. Thus, the concentration on achieved functionings has merits over the feasible rivals (even though it may not be based on as much information 'as would be needed to attract intrinsic importance to freedom ). And in terms of data availability, keeping track of functionings (in cluding vital ones such as being well-nourished and avoiding escapable morbidity or premature mortality) is typically no harder -often much easier -than getting data on commodity use (es pecially divisions within the family) , not to men tion utilities.
The capability approach can, thus, be used at various levels of sophistication, and how far we can go would depend much on the practical consider ation of what data we can get and whatwe cannot. In so far as freedom is seen to be intrinsically im portant, the observation of the chosen functioning bundle cannot be in itself an adequate guide for the evaluative exercise, even though the freedom to choose a better bundle rather than a worse one can be seen to be, in some accounting, an advan tageevenfrom the perspective of freedom. 29 The point can be illustrated with a particular example. An expansion of longevity is seen, by cornmon agreement, as an enhancement of the quality of life (though,strictly speaking, I suppose one can think of it as an enhancement of the quan tity of life). This is so partly because living longer is an achievement that is valued. It is also partly so because other achievements, such as avoiding mor bidity, tend to go with longevity (and thus lon gevity serves also as a proxy for some achieve ments that too are intrinsically valued). But greater longevity can ' also be seen as an enhancement of the freedom ' to live long. We often take this for granted on the solid ground that given the option, people value living longer; and thus the observed achievement of livinglonger reflects a greater free dom than was enjoyed, The interpretative question arises at this pre cisepoint. Why is it evidenceof greater freedomas such that a person ends up living longer rather than shorter? Why can it not be just a preferred achievement, but involving no difference in terms of freedom? One answer is to say that one always does have the option of killing oneself, and thus an expansion of longevity expands one's options. But there is a further issue here. Consider a case in which, for some reason (either legal or psycholog ical or whatever), one cannot really kill oneself (despite the presence in the world of poisons, knives, tall buildings and other useful objects). Would we then say that the person does not have more freedom by virtue of being free to livelonger though not shorter? It can be argued that if the person values, prefers and wishes to choose living longer, then the change in questionis in fact an ex pansion of the person's freedom, since the valua tion of freedom cannot be dissociated from the as sessment of the actual options in terms of the person's evaluative judgements.l?
The idea of freedom takes us beyond achievements, but that does not entail that the as sessment of freedom must be independent of that of achievements. The freedom to live the kind of life one would take to livehas importance that the freedom to live the kind of life one would hate to have does not. Thus, the temptation to see more freedom in greater longevity is justifiable from sev eral points of view, including noting the option of ending one's life and being sensitive to the evalua tive structure of achievements, which directly af fect the metric of freedom. The bottom line of all this is to recognize that the use of the capability approach even in the reduced fonn of concentrat ing on the achieved functionings (longevity, ab sence of morbidity, avoidance of undernourish ment etc.) may give more role to the value of freedom than might have been initially apparent.
INEQUALITY, CLASS AND GENDER
The choice of an approach to the evaluation of well-being and advantage has bearings on many Development as Capability Expansion exercises. These include the assessment of effi ciency as well as inequality. Efficiency, as it is nor mally defined, is concerned with noting overall im provements, and in standard economictheory, this takes the form of checking whether sorneone's position has improved without anyone's position having gone down. A situation is efficient if and only if there is no alternative feasible situation in which sorneone's position is better and no one's worse. Obviously, the content of this criterion de pends crucially on the way individual advantage is defined. If it is defined in terms of utility,then this criterionof efficiency immediately becomes that of "Pareto optimality" (or "Pareto efficiency", as it is sometimes -more accurately -called). On the other hand,efficiency can be defined also in terms of other metrics, including that of the quality of life based on the evaluation of functionings and capabilities.
Similarly, the assessment of inequality too depends on the chosen indicator of individual ad vantage. The usual inequalitymeasures that can be found in empirical economic literatures tend to concentrateon inequalities of incomesor wealth.'! These are valuable contributions. On the other hand, in so far as income and wealth,do not give adequate account of quality of life, there is a case for basing the evaluation of inequalityon informa tion more closely related to livingstandards.
Indeed, the two informational bases are not alternatives. Inequalityof wealth maytell us things about the generation and persistence of inequali ties of ether types, even when our ultimate con cern maybe with inequality of livingstandard and quality of life. Particularly in the context of the continuation and stubbornness of social divisions, information on inter-class inequalities in wealth and property ownership is especially crucial. But this recognition does not reduce the importance of bringing in indicators of quality of life to assess the actual inter-class inequalities of well-being and freedom. One field in which inequalities are particu larly hard to assess is that 'Of gender difference.
There is a great deal of general evidence to indi cate that women often have a much worse deal than men do, and that girls are often much more deprived than boys. These differences may be re flected in many subtle as well as crude ways, and in various fOnDS they can be observed in different parts of the world -among both rich and poor countries. However, it is not easy to determine what is the best indicator of advantage in terms of which these gender inequalities are to be exam ined. There is, to be sure, no need to look for one specific metric only, and the need for plurality of indicators is as strong here as in any other field. But there is still an issue of the choice of approach to well-being and advantage in the assessment of inequalities between women and men. The approach of utility-based evaluation is particularly limiting in this context, since the un equal deals that obtain, particularly within the family, are often made "acceptable" by certain so cial notions of "normal" arrangements, and this may affect the perceptions of women as well as men of the comparative levels of well-being they · respectively enjoy. For example, in the context of some developing countries such as India, the point has been made that rural women may' have no clear perception of being deprived of things that men have, and may not be in fact any more unhappy than men are. This mayor may not be the case, but even if it were so, it can be argued that the mental metric of utility may be particu larly inappropriate for judging inequality in this context. The presence of objective deprivation in the form of greater undernourishment, more frequent morbidity, lower literacy etc. cannot be rendered irrelevant just by the quiet and un grumbling acceptance of women of their deprived conditions.J2
In rejecting utility-based evaluations, it may be tempting to go in the direction ~f actual com modities (enjoyed by women and men, respec tively) to check inequalities between them. There is here the problem, already discussed earlier in this paper, that commodity-based evaluations are inadequate because commodities are merelymeans to well-being and freedom and do not reflect the nature of the lives that the people involved can lead. But, in addition, there is the further problem that it is hard -sometimes impossible-to get con firmation on how the commodities belonging to the family are divided between men and women, and between boys and girls. For example, studieson the division of food within the family tend to be deeply problematic since the observation needed to see who is eating howmuch is hard to carry out with any degree of reliability. On the other hand, it is possible to compare signs of undernourishment of boys and girls, to checktheir respective morbidity ratesetc., and these functioning differences are both easier to observe and of greater intrinsic relevance.P There are indeed inequalities between men and women in terms of functionings, and in the context of developing countries the contrast may be sharp even in basic matters of life and death, health, illness, education and illiteracy. For exam ple, despite the fact when men and women are treated reasonably equally in terms of food and health care (as they tend to be in the richer coun tries, even though gender biases may remain in other -less elementary -fields), women seem to have a greater ability to survive than men, in the bulkof the developing economies, menoutnumber women by large margins. While the ratio of fe males to males in Europe and North America tends to be about 1.06 or so, that ratio is below 0.95 for the Middle East (including countries in Western Asia and North Africa), South Asia (including India, Pakistan and Bangladesh) and China. J4 This crudefigure of the ratioof survived females to sur vived males already tells .a story that has much in formational value in judging inter-gender inequali ties. Sometimes there are sharp contrasts even within a country (e.g, the ratio of females to males varies within India all the way from 1.03 in Kerala to 0.87 or 0.88 in Haryana and Punjab). From the point of view of studying both the actual situations and the causal influences operating in the genera tion of inter-gender inequalities, these regional contrasts may be particularly important.
Being ableto survive is of courseonlyone ca pability (though undoubtedly a very basic one), and other comparisons can be made withinfonna tion on health, morbidity etc. The ability to read and writeis also another important capability, and here it can be seen that the ratio of female to male literacy rates is often shockingly low in different parts of the world. The combined effects of low literacy rates in general (a deprivation of a basic capability across genders) and gender inequalities in literacy rates (unequal deprivation of this basic capability for women) tend to be quite disastrous denials for women. It appears that even leaving out many countries for which no reliable data exist, in a great many countries in the world, the female literacy rate is still below 50 per cent. In fact, it is below even 30 per cent for as many as 26 countries, below 20 per cent for 16 and below 10 per cent in at least five. J5 In general, the perspective of functionings and capabilities provides a plausible approach to examining inter-gender inequalities. It does not sufferfrom the type of subjectivism that makes util ity-based accounting particularly obtuse in dealing with entrenched inequalities. Nor does it suffer from the overconcentration on means that com modity-based accounting undoubtedly does, and in fact it has better informational sources in study ing inequalities within the family than is provided byguesswork on commodity distribution (e.g.,who is eating how muchr). The case of inter-gender in equalities is, of course, only one illustration of the advantages that the capability approachhas. But it happens to be an illustration that is particularly im portant on its own as well, given the pervasive and stubborn nature of inequalities between women and men in differentparts of the world.
CONCLUSION
The assessment of achievement and advantage of members of the society is a central part of devel opment analysis . In this paper, I have tried to dis cuss how the capability approach may be used to substantiate the evaluative concerns of human de velopment. The focus on human achievement and freedom, and on ' the need for reflective -rather than mechanical -evaluation, is an adaptation of an old tradition that can be fruitfully used in pro viding a conceptual basisfor analysing the tasks of human development in the contemporary world. The foundational importance of human capabili ties provides a firm basis for evaluating living stan dards and the quality of life, and also points to a general format in termsof which problems of effi ciency and equality can both be discussed.
The concentration on distinct capabilities entails, by its very nature, a pluralistapproach. In deed, it points to the necessiry of seeing develop ment as a combination of distinct processes, rather than as the expansion of some apparently homo geneous magnitude such as real income or utiliry. The things that peoplevalue doingor beingcan be quite diverse, and the valuable capabilities vary from suchelementary freedoms as being free from hunger and undernourishment to such complex abilities as achieving self-respect and socialpartic ipation. The challenge of human development de mands attention being paid to a variety of sectoral concerns and a combination of social and eco nomic processes.
In the collection of papers of which this one is a part, there are a number of specific studies dealing withsuch matters as education, health and nutrition, as wellas the process of agricultural ex pansion and industrial development. The prob lems of resource mobilization and participatory development are also addressed. Some of the sub jects thus covered deal with variables that are direct determinants of human capabiliry (e.g., ed ucation and health), while others relate to instru mental influences that operate through economic or social process (e.g., the promotion of agricul tural andindustrial productiviry). The uniting fea ture is the motivating concern with human devel opment and its constitutive characteristics.
L, the distinction betweenfunctionings and capabilities, emphasis was placed on the impor tanceof having the freedom to chooseone kind of life rather than another. This is an emphasis that distinguishes the capabiliry approach from anyac counting of only realized achievements. However, the ability to exercise freedom may, to a consider able extent, be directly dependent on the educa tion we have received, and thus the development of the educational sector may have a foundational connection with the capability-based approach,
In fact, educational expansion has a variety of roles that have to be carefully distinguished. First, more education can help productiviry. Sec ondly, wide sharing of educational advancement 12 Readings in Human Development can contribute to a better distribution of the ag gregate national income among different people. Thirdly, being better educated can help in the conversion of incomes and resources into various functioning and ways of living. Last (and by no means the least), education also helps in the intel ligentchoicebetween different typesof lives that a person can lead. All these distinct influences can have important bearings on the development of valuable capabilities and thus on the process of human development.
There are also other interconnections be tweenthe different areas coveredin the collection; for example, good health is an achievement in it selfand also contributes both to higher productiv iry and to an enhanced abiliry to convert incomes and resources into good living. In focusing on human capabilities as the yardstick in terms of which successes and failures of human develop ment are to be judged, attention is particularly in vited to addressing these social interconnections. Given clarity regarding the ends (avoiding, in par ticular, the pitfall of treating human beings as means), the social and economic instrumentalities involved in the ends-means relations can be exten sively explored.
. One of the most important tasks of an evalu ative system is to do justice to our deeply held human values. The challenge of "human develop ment in the 1980s and beyond" cannot be fully grasped without consciously facing this issue and paying deliberate attention to the enhancementof those freedoms and capabilities that matter most in the lives that we can lead. To broaden the lim ited lives into which the majority of human beings are willy-nilly imprisoned by force of circum stances is the major challenge of human develop. ment in the contemporary world. Informed and intelligent evaluation both of the lives we are forced to lead and of the lives we would be able to choose to lead through bringing about social changes is the first step in confronting that chal lenge. It is a task that we must face.
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